Abstract. In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of "relevant" implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap's entailment. In this paper I provide for the first time the logic of first degree analytic containment, as presented in [2] and [3], with a semantical characterization-leaving higher degree systems for future investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special sort of truth-predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead of individual formulas, and which behave in some respects like Gentzen's sequents. This semantics captures very general properties of the truth-functional connectives, and for that reason it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical consequence and Anderson and Belnap's "tautological entailments".
las with nested ↔. The latter system thus essentially embodies properties of first degree analytic containment.
In this paper I shall focus on the 1989 system, and on the first degree fragment of the 1977 system (which was actually Angell's center of interest in [2] ), and the aim is basically to provide them with semantical characterizations. I shall leave the task of dealing with systems involving formulas of arbitrary degrees for future work.
It is perhaps worth saying a word or two about what analytic containment is. Angell's informal definition of analytic containment is not very perspicuous. For instance, in one sense, the meaning of a sentence is contained in the meaning of its negation. But it is clear that Angell does not want to say that for any sentence p, ¬p analytically contains p. ("Proof": his systems would represent the principle as a theorem, but they do not.)
As far as I can see, analytic containment amounts to this: sentence p analytically contains sentence q when one can "extract" the information given by q from the information given by p only by looking at the meaning of the components of p and q-or again, more objectively, when in virtue of the meaning of the constituents of p and q, the information given by q is carried by, or is part of, the information given by p.
It may be thought that in the above explication reference to meanings is useless. For, one might argue, information containment is always a question of meaning: for any sentences p and q, if the information given by p contains the information given by q, then this is true in virtue of what p and q mean.
However, reference to meanings allows one to formulate a certain distinction between two notions of analytic containment which, I think, is worth formulating. One of these notions is the one which has been defined above (keep on calling it 'analytic containment'), the other one is stronger and we shall call it 'logical containment'. Logical containment is related to analytic containment as logical truth to analytic truth. An analytic truth (e.g. 'Sam is a man if Sam is a bachelor') is a sentence true in virtue of the meaning of its components; a logical truth (e.g. 'Sam is a man if Sam is a man and Sam likes chocolate') is a sentence true in virtue of the meaning of its logical components. Similarly, sentence q (e.g. 'Sam is a man') is analytically contained in sentence p (e.g. 'Sam is a bachelor') when one can extract the information given by q from the information given by p by looking at the meaning of the components of p and q; and sentence q (e.g. 'Sam is a man') is logically contained in sentence p (e.g. 'Sam is a man and Sam likes chocolate') when one can extract the information given by q from the information given by p only by looking at the meaning of the logical components of p and q.
Although the two notions are distinct, in each of Angell's systems → may be interpreted indifferently as analytic containment or as logical containment.
The System AC
My formulation of Angell's 1989 system is somewhat different than his own, but the differences are minor. In the sequel, 'system AC' will denote my version of the system.
We start with a classical propositional language L with primitive operators ¬ and ∨ (∧ is defined in the usual way in terms of ¬ and ∨) augmented with the binary operator → representing analytic containment. The formulas of the system are all truth-functional compounds of atoms, plus every formula of type A → B, where A and B contain no occurrence of →. In what follows, I shall use A, B, ... for formulas containing no arrows, and I shall call them 'TFFs'.
System AC is then defined by the following axiom schemata and rules (here and below, any occurrence of → has to be understood as having the widest possible scope):
We shall use 'A B' to mean that A → B is a theorem of AC, and 'A B' to mean that both A B and B A. One can then prove: 
For a comparison, Angell's original system in [3] is formulated as follows (with mutual analytic containment ↔ taken as primitive, and A → B defined as A ↔ (A ∧ B)): 
Semantics for AC
One natural idea to model analytic containment is to follow a standard way of modelling e.g. classical consequence: introduce a certain kind of models which assign certain semantic properties to the atoms of the language, then recursively define a notion of truth in a model for all TFFs, in such a way that A B iff B is true in every model where A is true. This is the way I am going to proceed.
Such a semantical treatment of analytic containment meets some difficulties, mainly because of the behavior of disjunction. Given the fact that A → A ∨ B is not derivable in AC, the truth of A in a model m should not yield the truth in m of A ∨ B for any arbitrary B. This means that, in the present context, we must do without the familiar sounding truth-clause for disjunction 'A ∨ B is true in m iff A is true in m or B is true in m'.
The semantics I present in this section is very unusual. In this semantics, instead of assigning semantic properties to individual atoms (like e.g. having or lacking this or that truth-value), the models assign semantic properties to collections of atoms-more precisely, to pairs of such collections. Relative to any model, a truth predicate which applies to pairs of collections of formulas is defined, as well as a truth predicate which applies to individual formulasthe second being defined in terms of the first.
More concretely, we define a valuation on language L as a set of pairs of finite subsets of the set At of all atoms of L. For any given valuation v, we define a truth predicate which applies to arbitrary pairs of finite sets of TFFs, v . For the sake of readability, I shall write Γ v ∆ instead of v ( Γ, ∆ ), and I shall use a standard convention used in sequent calculi of using commas instead of union signs, and of omitting the set-theoretical brackets around TFFs. 'Γ v ∆' should be read 'according to v, the disjunction of all the negated members of Γ and of all the members of ∆ is true'. As the reader will see, the analogy with sequents goes beyond the above notational convention.
The definition of v is as follows: 
(a) Γ
The clause for conjunction is then:
Note that no TFF is true in every valuation. Also note that truth in a valuation has a special behavior with respect to disjunction (but not conjunction): from the truth of A one cannot in general infer the truth of A∨ B, and conversely from the truth of A∨ B one cannot infer that A is true or B is true. 4 Truth in a valuation behaves in this respect like membership to a (real) belief set: you may believe that Sam is either at home or at the stadium without having a belief as to exactly where he is; and you may believe that Sam is at home without believing that he is at home or the number of pens in my office is 7.
Arbitrary valuations, though, are not appropriate for modelling analytic containment in the way suggested at the beginning of this section. For let p, q and r be atoms of L. By (T9) p ∧ (q ∨ r) p ∨ q. Now let v be the valuation whose sole members are ∅, {p} and ∅, {q, r} . Then v p∧(q∨r) but v p ∨ q. We need valuations of a certain kind, which I shall call ACvaluations.
An AC-valuation is a valuation which satisfies the following condition: 
Soundness
The soundness of AC with respect to the previous semantics-i.e. the fact that A B entails A B-will be proved indirectly.
Where v is a valuation, let us say that A v B iff for every finite set of TFFs Γ, the following two conditions hold:
We shall first prove that for every AC-valuation v, if A B then A v B. Then given that for every valuation v, if A v B, then v A implies v B, this will establish the soundness of AC with respect to the proposed semantics. 5 We shall need the following important proposition, which says that the defining condition of AC-valuations described in the previous section transmits from atoms to arbitrary TFFs:
Proof. Let the degree of a TFF A be the natural number d(A) recursively defined by the following 3 clauses: (i) if
The degree of a set Γ of TFFs is then defined as max{d(A) : A ∈ Γ}. One may prove the proposition by induction on the degree of Γ ∪ Γ ∪ Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ in the following way. Let v be an AC-valuation. Then by definition, proposition 1 holds when Γ ∪ Γ ∪ Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ is of degree 0. Suppose now that it holds whenever Γ ∪ Γ ∪ Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ ∪ ∆ is of degree ≤ n, and let Γ, Γ , Γ , ∆, ∆ and ∆ be such that their union is of degree n + 1. Then each set Ψ among the above 6 may be decomposed into three components: Ψ 1 , the set of all TFFs in Ψ of degree ≤ n; Ψ 2 , the set of all TFFs in Ψ of the form ¬A of degree n + 1; and Ψ 3 , the set of all TFFs in Ψ of the form A ∨ B of degree n + 1.
Before proceeding further, some definitions are in order. In what follows, where Ψ is any set of TFFs of form ¬A, 'Ψ' will denote the set of all TFFs A such that ¬A ∈ Ψ; and where Ψ is any set of TFFs of form A ∨ B, ' Ψ' will denote the set of all TFFs A such that for some TFF B, A ∨ B ∈ Ψ or B ∨ A ∈ Ψ. In case Ψ is empty, both 'Ψ' and ' Ψ' will denote the empty set. Finally, let Ψ be any set of cardinal n ≥ 2, containing only TFFs of form A ∨ B. Assume a numbering of all the disjunctions of L, and say that Ψ is Then:
So:
Then by induction hypothesis, for all x ∈ − → Γ 3 , y ∈ − → Γ 3 and z ∈ − → Γ 3 :
i.e.:
But this implies that: 
By (a) and (b), Γ v A ∨ (B ∧ C) iff Γ v (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C). By (c) and (e), if A∨(B ∧C), (A∨B)∧(A∨C) v Γ, then A∨(B ∧C) v Γ; and the converse holds by proposition 4.1. By (d) and (e), if
and once again the converse holds by proposition 4.
So, A∨(B ∧C) v (A∨B)∧(A∨C) and (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) v A ∨ (B ∧ C).

(for (AC7))
Suppose that both A v B and B v A, i.e. that for every finite set of TFFs Γ the following three conditions hold: 
Then let Γ be a finite set of TFFs. 
Completeness
Let Γ be an arbitrary non-empty, finite set of TFFs. We define the notion of a Γ-formula recursively as follows:
• All TFFs in Γ are Γ-formulas;
• If A and B are Γ-formulas, then so is A ∨ B.
A maximal Γ-formula is a Γ-formula containing all TFFs in Γ (a given TFF may appear several times in a maximal Γ-formula). It is clear that in system AC, any two maximal Γ-formulas A and B are such that A B. We shall call this principle Disjunctive Equivalence.
To every non-empty finite set of TFFs Γ, we associate a given maximal Γ-formula we call Γ + (say, the first such formula according to an initial numbering of all the TFFs). We put Γ − = {¬A : A ∈ Γ} + . In what follows, every occurrence of an expression like 'Γ − ∨ A' or 'A ∨ Γ − ' should be understood as 'A' if the set Γ is empty. And similarly, every occurrence of an expression like '∆ + ∨ A' or 'A ∨ ∆ + ' should be understood as 'A' if the set ∆ is empty.
For every TFF A, let v(A) be the set defined as follows:
is a finite set of atoms, and
v(A) is obviously a valuation.
Proposition 5.1. For all finite sets of TFFs Γ and ∆ such that
Proof. In order to prove this, it is enough to prove the following four claims:
Given (AC9) and (T10), it is enough to prove the following:
Points 1 and 3 directly follow from Disjunctive Equivalence. For the remaining two points:
The result follows from (AC9).
• By Disjunctive Equivalence,
, and thus by Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), (Γ,
. By (AC6a), (AC6b) and (AC9), we have then 
In order to prove that
The result is immediate. CASE 2: Γ ∪ ∆ = ∅ (and so, Γ ∪ ∆ = ∅). By (1), (2), (T12), (T3) however, seems to be in any case quite natural. For following Angell's intuitions, which seem to be sound, p analytically contains q iff p and p ∧ q carry exactly the same information. But if two sentences p and q carry the same information, then the truth of any sentence containing p implies the truth of the corresponding sentence obtained by replacing one or more occurrence of p by q, and conversely the falsity of any sentence containing p implies the falsity of the corresponding sentence obtained by replacing one or more occurrence of p by q. Now putting these intuitions together, it becomes quite natural to adopt the more complicated notion of semantic containment in order to model analytic containment. For A v B iff for all finite sets of TFFs Γ and ∆, (a)
Remark II. Let Min be the system whose axioms are:
• all formulas A → B with A and B maximal Γ-formulas for some set Γ, and
• all formulas A → A[¬¬B/B] and A → A[B/¬¬B],
and whose rules are:
Let us say that formula A semantically contains* formula B iff B is true in every valuation where A is true. It is quite easy to establish that if A → B is a theorem of Min, then A semantically contains* B. The converse holds because in the above completeness proof for AC, only principles of Min have been used except in the proof for proposition 5.3.
Getting New Consequence Relations
As we saw, Anderson and Belnap's system of tautological entailments E fde is AC plus A → A ∨ B. Given the previous results, it is quite easy to get a characterization of E fde in the present semantical framework. Let a TE-valuation be a valuation v which satisfies the following condition:
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• For all finite sets of atoms Γ, Γ , ∆ and ∆ , if Γ, • For every finite non-empty set of atoms Γ, Γ, Γ ∈ v.
This property transmits to arbitrary TFFs, i.e. if v is a PC-valuation, then Γ v Γ for every finite non-empty set of TFFs Γ. (As above, a proof may be given following the method used in the proof of proposition 4. Here is another modelling of classical consequence which involves certain valuations which will be useful in the next section. Where c is any set of atoms, we let c be the valuation defined by c = { Γ, ∆ ∪ {A} : A ∈ c, Γ∪∆ finite set of atoms}∪{ Γ∪{A}, ∆ : A / ∈ c, Γ∪∆ finite set of atoms}. It is easy to see that c is a PC-valuation. Thus we can establish that for every formula X, m X iff X ∈ @. Since ¬X 0 ∈ @, m X 0 , and so X 0 is not valid. So since X 0 was arbitrary: 
Concluding Remark
Interesting developments of the previous material should go in at least the following two directions: (i) building systems for analytic containment in which formulas with nested arrows are taken into account, and specific axioms about such formulas are added, and (ii) getting a better understanding of the kind of valuations which have been introduced in this paper.
